Mardonius then sought to break the stalemate by sending his cavalry to attack the passes of Mount Cithaeron; this raid resulted in the capture of a convoy of provisions intended for the Greeks.
Two further days passed, during which time the supply lines of the Greeks continued to be menaced. Mardonius then launched a further cavalry raid on the Greek lines, which succeeded in blocking the Gargaphian Spring, which had been the only source of water for the Greek army they could not use the Asopus due to the threat posed by the Persian archers.
Coupled with the lack of food, the restriction of the water supply made the Greek position untenable, so they decided to retreat to a position in front of Plataea, from where they could guard the passes and have access to fresh water. To prevent the Persian cavalry attacking the retreat, it was to be performed that night. However, the retreat went badly awry.
The Allied contingents in the centre missed their appointed position, and ended up scattered in front of Plataea itself. The Athenians, Tegeans and Spartans, who had been guarding the rear of the retreat, had not even begun to retreat by daybreak. A single Spartan division was thus left on the ridge to guard the rear, whilst the Spartans and Tegeans retreated uphill; Pausanias also instructed the Athenians to begin the retreat and if possible to join up with the Spartans.
However, the Athenians at first retreated directly towards Plataea, and thus the Allied battle line remained fragmented as the Persian camp began to stir. The Greeks. According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45, men; 5, Spartiates full citizen soldiers , 5, other Lacedaemonian hoplites perioeci and 35, helots seven per Spartiate. This was probably the largest Spartan force ever assembled.
The Greek army had been reinforced by contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states. The Persians. According to Herodotus, the Persians numbered , and were accompanied by troops from Greek city states which supported the Persian cause including Thebes.
Herodotus admits that no-one counted the latter, so he guesses that there were 50, of them. Ctesias, who wrote a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed there were , Persian and 7, Greek soldiers, but his account is generally garbled for instance, placing this battle before Salamis. Nevertheless, his figure is remarkably close to that generated by modern consensus.
The figure of , has been doubted, along with many of Herodotus's numbers, by many historians; modern consensus estimates the total number of troops for the Persian invasion at around , According to this consensus, Herodotus's , Persians at Plataea would self-evidently be impossible. One approach to estimating the size of the Persian army has been to estimate how many men might feasibly have been accommodated within the Persian camp; this approach gives figures of between 70, and , men.
Lazenby, for instance, by comparison with later Roman military camps calculates a number of 70, troops, including 10, cavalry.
Meanwhile, Connolly derives a number of , from the same sized camp. Indeed, most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range. Strategic and tactical considerations.
In some ways, the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon; there was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the other. The reasons for this stalemate were primarily tactical, and similar to the situation at Marathon; the Greek hoplites did not want to risk being outflanked by the Persian cavalry, and the lightly armed Persian infantry could not hope to assault well defended positions.
According to Herodotus, both sides wished for a decisive battle which would tip the war in their favor. However, Lazenby believed that Mardonius's actions during the Plataea campaign were not consistent with an aggressive policy. He interprets the Persian operations during the prelude not as attempts to force the Allies into battle, but as attempts to force the Allies into retreat which indeed became the case.
Mardonius may have felt he had little to gain in battle, and that he could simply wait for the Greek alliance to fall apart as it had nearly done over the winter. The can be little doubt from Herodotus's account that Mardonius was prepared to accept battle on his own terms however. Regardless of the exact motives, the initial strategic situation allowed both sides to procrastinate, since food supplies were in ample supply for both armies.
Under these conditions, the tactical considerations outweighed the strategic need for action. When Mardonius's raids disrupted the Allied supply chain, it forced a strategic rethink on the part of the Allies. Rather than now moving to attack, however, they instead looked to retreat and secure their lines of communication. Despite this defensive move from the Greeks, it was in fact the chaos resulting from this retreat which finally ended the stalemate.
Mardonius perceived this as a full-on retreat, in effect thinking that the battle was already over, and sought to pursue the Greeks. Since he did not expect the Greeks to fight, the tactical problems were no longer an issue, and he tried to take advantage of the altered strategic situation he thought he had produced. Conversely, the Greeks had, inadvertently, lured Mardonius into attacking them on the higher ground and, despite being outnumbered, were thus at a tactical advantage.
The Battle. Once the Persians discovered that the Greeks had abandoned their positions, and appeared to be in retreat, Mardonius decided to set off in immediate pursuit with the elite Persian infantry. As he did so, the rest of the Persian army, unbidden, also began to move forward. The Spartans and Tegeans had by now reached the Temple of Demeter. The rearguard under Amompharetus began to withdraw from the ridge, under pressure from Persian cavalry, to join them. Pausanias sent a messenger to the Athenians, asking them to join up with the Spartans.
However, the Athenians had been engaged by the Theban phalanx, and unable to assist Pausanias. The Spartans and Tegeans were first assaulted by the Persian cavalry, whilst the Persian infantry made their way forward. The Persian infantry then planted their shields and began firing arrows at the Greeks, whilst the cavalry withdrew.
According to Herodotus, Pausanias refused to advance, because good omens were not divined in the goat-sacrifices that were performed. At this point, as men began to fall under the barrage of arrows, the Tegeans started to run at the Persian lines.
Offering one last sacrifice and a prayer to the heavens, Pausanias finally received favorable omens, and gave the command for the Spartans to advance, whereupon they too charged the Persian lines. The numerically superior Persian infantry were of the heavy by Persian standards sparabara formation, but this was still much lighter than the Greek phalanx. The Persian defensive weapon was a large wicker shield, and they used short spears; by contrast the hoplites were armored in bronze, with a bronze shield and a long spear.
As at Marathon, it was a severe mismatch. The fight was fierce and long, but the Greeks continued to push into the Persian lines. The Persians tried to break the Greeks' spears by grabbing hold of them, but the Greeks were able to use their swords instead. Mardonius was present at the scene, riding a white horse, and surrounded by a bodyguard of 1, men, and whilst he remained, the Persians stood their ground. However, the Spartans closed in on Mardonius, and a stone thrown by the Spartan Aeimnestus hit him in the head, killing him.
With Mardonius dead, the Persians began to flee, although his bodyguard remained and were annihilated. Quickly the rout became general, with many Persians fleeing in disorder to their camp. However, Artabazus who had earlier commanded the Sieges of Olynthus and Potidea , had disagreed with Mardonius about attacking the Greeks, and he had not fully engaged the forces under his command.
As the rout commenced, he led these men 40, according to Herodotus away from the battle field, on the road to Thessaly, hoping to escape eventually to the Hellespont. On the opposite side of the battle field, the Athenians had triumphed in a tough battle against the Thebans. The other Greeks fighting for the Persians had deliberately fought badly, according to Herodotus. The Thebans retreated from the battle, but in a different direction from the Persians, allowing them to escape without further losses.
The Allied Greeks, reinforced by the contingents who had not taken part in the main battle, then stormed the Persian camp. When his terms were rudely rejected the satrap briefly occupied Athens for a second time, completely destroying an already ruined city.
Then news reached him of an advancing Spartan army, forcing him to take to the field. Both sides had amassed huge armies. Almost every city in Greece had sent a contingent to support the effort, and in total they numbered approximately 60, hoplites and 40, light infantry.
Herodotus claims their Persian opponents numbered 1. The battle itself was actually a series of battles. Aided by a contingent of Boeotian collaborators the Persians were initially very successful, but when Mardonius himself was killed leading a cavalry charge, the tide changed and most of the force was annihilated.
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