Due to the brevity of this essay only the first intertextual model, namely official discourse, will be analyzed here. The sources that are analyzed therefore come directly from the PRC or Filipino governments. The aim is to show how PRC and Filipino officially-articulated identities constitute and are constituted by the dispute. The difference in time scale is due to the lack of Filipino sources from the years prior to The analysis therefore assumes that the Filipino discourse did not change substantially from The criteria for choosing these sources are as follows 1 the source includes clear articulations of identities and policies; 2 is widely read and attended to; 3 comes from a formal authority that defines the political position.
The items include speeches, communiques, press conference transcripts and official notifications. The unequal number of Chinese and Filipino items is due to the large amount of PRC sources available online. Despite the smaller number of Filipino items, these were actually more concentrated on the Spratly Islands than the Chinese ones — this is probably due to the fact that the Chinese items focused on multiple of its South China Sea disputes.
Naturally, only those statements pertaining to the Spratly Islands or the South China Sea in general were analyzed. Much of the Chinese discourse focuses on the cooperation and stability of the region. The PRC thus sees the dispute as a potential obstacle to regional peace, stability and prosperity and presses for peaceful negotiations and solutions.
In this way the PRC is portraying itself as a force for regional peace, but also conveying the notion that China cannot be peaceful on its own. This self-image induces the PRC to portray any aggression by other states as a disturbance to regional stability.
Thus the PRC portrays itself as a peaceful state, whereas the Philippines is portrayed as an aggressive warship-sending state that goes against the consensus for peace and purposely misleads public opinion. Clearly in this image the PRC is acting morally correct, whereas the Philippines is acting unacceptably.
Another type of discourse is, however, also discernible. It is best described as realist discourse grounded in a history-focused narrative. They did not occupy a single inch of land. As long-time victims of foreign aggression and humiliation, the Chinese people are keenly aware of the meaning of national independence, sovereignty, security and world peace.
We will never inflict such sufferings upon other nations. China has indisputable sovereignty over the Island. China has ample jurisprudential evidence supporting its sovereign rights over the Island.
The waters surrounding the Huangyan Island has been a traditional fishing ground for Chinese fishermen. Since ancient times, Chinese fishermen have been fishing in waters surrounding the Island. Thus the PRC is using very modern-day realist language, but justifying its claim in historical terms. The past is extremely important to the PRC and to its conception of itself. To some extent the PRC views history as a way of determining what is true and regards it as outweighing all other arguments.
This high regard of history might be linked to its fear of forgetting history and repeating past mistakes. History provides all the proof that is needed. The Philippines convey a strong belief that international law can solve the dispute. The Philippines, however, underline that making use of international law is the only way to ensure this peace — this was underlined when the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings under Article of UNCLOS against the PRC, challenging its claims in the South China Sea.
We truly believe that the arbitral proceedings would bring this dispute to a durable solution. The Philippines believes that what ultimately counts is international law and that it overrules other approaches to the dispute.
To some extent then, the Filipino way of knowing in relation to the dispute is through international law. The Philippines believes that international law points to what constitutes right from wrong. Much like the PRC, the Philippines also think that we can learn from the past. However, the Philippines, rather than believing in the lessons of history, believes that we can learn from past cases in international law.
The Filipino discourse for example refers to the Palmas Island Case as a precedent to the Spratly one. International law provides all the proof that is needed. The Filipino self-perception might be what led it to see the dispute through legal terms. To some extent, the Philippines views itself as the less powerful actor, however, believes that the law is the way to challenge the PRC.
This exhibits a certain sense of the Philippines being the underdog, who can nevertheless overcome the bigger powers by uniting in playing the game that we are all equal in; the law. The perception of the PRC as the physically stronger part is also visible from the Filipino discourse. The PRC is viewed as a rigid hardliner who make the continuation of negotiations impossible — this according to the Philippines is the main reason for the initiation of the arbitration. This essay has sought to identify and explain the major dynamics of the Spratly Islands dispute.
It has done so by first recounting the background of the dispute and reviewing the existing literature on the dispute. As shown, most of the literature identifies the major dynamics of the dispute through realist lenses whilst suggesting solutions to the dispute in liberalist terms. A limited amount of constructivist approaches exist, none of these, however, undertake a thorough analysis of the underlying identities and perceptions of the dispute.
Moreover, the PRC discourse revealed a certain type of epistemology used by the PRC; utilizing history as a way of knowing and thus as a way of telling right from wrong.
The PRC thus emphasizes the importance of learning from the past in order to improve the world we live in. Contrastingly, the Philippines perceives itself as a peaceful state, acting within the boundaries prescribed by international law. It identifies itself as less powerful than the PRC, however, understands international law as a way to stand up to the PRC.
The PRC is, perceived as an aggressive hardliner who has made dialogue impossible. The Filipino discourse shows that it has come to view international law, and particularly UNCLOS, as the only way to objectively tell right from wrong in the dispute.
For the Philippines international law is thus the only way to know who the Spratly Islands belong to. At the heart of the dispute therefore, lie two fundamentally different epistemological foci. One state believes in the power of history to determine who has sovereignty over what, whereas the other state believes that applying the law is the only way to determine this. It is as if the PRC and the Philippines are speaking two different languages with very different grammatical rules, therefore not understanding each other.
Furthermore, each state perceives itself as the good guy and the other as the aggressor. This, combined with the two incompatible understandings of how to determine what the right solution is, serves to reproduce the dispute in irreconcilable terms and drives it into a deadlock of conflicting identities and perceptions. Keqiang, H. Antelope Reef U. Board of Geographic Names: Antelope Reef. Bombay Reef U. Board of Geographic Names: Bombay Reef.
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